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1. Regarding the purpose of an anti-immigrant ordinance, a Farmers Branch, Texas
councilperson testified “the resolution was ‘one of several things that sent a
message to people who aren’t in the country legally, Farmers Branch is not the
place for you.’”  Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 675
F.3d 802, 805–06 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir.
2013).  Preemption of an area of the law by the federal government, ironically,
communicates this same message to the states.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the City of Fremont, Nebraska passed an ordinance that,
among other things, prohibited undocumented immigrants2 from rent-
ing housing within its borders.3  This ordinance is part of a trend by
state and local governments—developing since the mid-2000s—to de-
ter the influx of undocumented immigrants into their communities
and dispel those already present.4  This trend ostensibly reflects two
concerns.5  First, states enact these measures citing pressures created
2. Court decisions and laws may use the term “illegal immigrant,” “illegal alien,”
“undocumented entrant,” etc.  For consistency this Note will use the term “un-
documented immigrant” throughout.
3. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/B3M9-FSEG.
4. There were 39 pieces of state legislation related to immigrants in 2005. This
number increased to a peak of 353 in 2009 and remains elevated. State Laws
Related to Immigration and Immigrants, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-laws-related-to-immigra-
tion-and-immigrants.aspx (last updated Feb. 24, 2014), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/AN9N-Y9DS; Lisa Maria Garza, Number of Immigration Mea-
sures Passed by U.S. States Jumps in 2013: Report, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2013,
11:38 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/us-usa-politics-immigra
tionlaws-idUSBRE98B03J20130912, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/ZG9Q-HK
L9.
5. A third concern—xenophobic animus—arguably underlies some of these efforts.
See Kristen Hinman, Valley Park to Mexican Immigrants: “Adios, illegals!”,
RIVERFRONT TIMES (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.riverfronttimes.com/2007-02-28/
news/valley-park-to-mexican-immigrants-adios-illegals/, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/HD6B-297X (quoting the Mayor of Valley Park, Missouri, who ad-
vocated and passed an anti-immigrant ordinance, as stating: “You got one guy
and his wife that settle down here, have a couple kids, and before long you have
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by the presence of large populations of undocumented immigrants.6
The resulting increase in the number of workers raises the supply of
labor, putting downward pressure on wages for low-skill jobs.7  There
is concern that undocumented immigrants create higher crime rates
and put pressure on local law enforcement services.8  There is also a
perception that undocumented immigrants burden emergency medical
services for health care9 and place an increased demand for educa-
tional services on local schools.10  Several states estimate undocu-
mented immigrant populations do not fully offset their fiscal impact
on state budgets with contributions to state tax revenues.11  Based on
these concerns, communities have felt compelled to dispel and deter
the presence of undocumented immigrants to protect local interests.12
Cousin Puerto Rico and Taco Whoever moving in.”); Dave Williams, Lawmakers
Pass Immigration Crackdown, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON. (Apr. 14, 2011, 6:58 PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2011/04/14/ga-senate-passes-immigra-
tion-bill.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/7HH9-27FF (quoting a state con-
gress person as stating: “I want to take care of our people, I don’t want to take
care of Mexican people.”).
6. See, e.g., Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
B3M9-FSEG (citing fiscal burdens, crimes, and unauthorized employment result-
ing from presence of undocumented immigrants); Escondido, Cal., Ordinance
2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9D7A-BXFM (“The
harboring of illegal aliens in dwelling units in the City, and crime committed by
illegal aliens harm the health, safety and welfare of legal residents in the City.”);
Riverside, N.J., Illegal Immigration Relief Act, Ordinance 2006-16 (July 26,
2006), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/U6LQ-SEJJ (citing negative impacts on
streets, housing, neighborhoods, classroom overcrowding, school budgets, crime
rates, public safety, and quality of life by undocumented immigrants).
7. GEORGE BORJAS, IMMIGRATION AND THE AMERICAN WORKER: A REVIEW OF THE ACA-
DEMIC LITERATURE 13 (2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JF9B-YE3L (con-
cluding undocumented immigrants are responsible for a 4% decrease in wages
earned by high-school dropouts).
8. See sources cited supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Illegal Immigration Enters the Health Care Debate,
WSJ.COM (Aug. 15, 2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB12502
7261061432585, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/UE5S-KWA8.
10. See, e.g., Richard F. LaMountain, Illegal Immigrants Burden Portland-Area
Schools, OREGONLIVE.COM (Oct. 3, 2009, 5:01 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/
opinion/index.ssf/2009/10/illegal_immigrants_burden_port.html, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/9Q8R-VYHG.
11. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS ON THE
BUDGETS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 9–10 (2007), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/3JVB-FXKD.
12. The impact undocumented immigrants have on local economies is a subject of
debate, as is the accuracy of such estimates. Id. at 1 (“It is important to
note . . . that currently available estimates have significant limitations; therefore,
using them to determine an aggregate effect [of the economic impact of undocu-
mented immigrants] across all states would be difficult and prone to considerable
error.”).  It is not clear whether or to what extent the burdens undocumented
immigrants place on local economies are offset by benefits, but some argue those
burdens are overstated.  See, e.g., Adam Davidson, Do Illegal Immigrants Actu-
ally Hurt the U.S. Economy?, NYTIMES.COM (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes
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Second, this increase in state and local anti-undocumented immi-
grant laws reflects frustration with the federal government.13  Many
feel strongly the federal government should effectively implement and
enforce federal immigration law to alleviate the pressures undocu-
mented immigrants place on states and localities.14  The perceived lo-
cal pressures outlined above are viewed as symptomatic of lax
enforcement and inadequate concern for communities affected by im-
migration.15  If the federal government is not going to hold up its
end—so the thinking goes—then affected communities must pick up
the slack.
States have attempted to control the influx of these unwanted
populations through statutes and local ordinances that take a variety
of approaches.  Some require the use of E-Verify16 by employers,17 im-
.com/2013/02/17/magazine/do-illegal-immigrants-actually-hurt-the-us-economy
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QA7R-HE39;
Gordon H. Hanson, The Economics and Policy of Illegal Immigration in the
United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 10 (Dec. 2009), http://www.migrationpolicy
.org/pubs/hanson-dec09.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JD38-JE3Q (“Many
unauthorized immigrants contribute to government coffers at the local, state, and
federal levels by paying income, payroll, property, and sales taxes.”); Meredith L.
King, Immigrants in the U.S. Health Care System: Five Myths that Misinform the
American Public, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 5 (June 7, 2007), http://www.american-
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2007/06/pdf/immigrant_health_report
.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/VBE8-F2MS (pointing to use of emergency
room services by less than 10% of documented and undocumented Mexican immi-
grants compared to 20% of whites and Mexican Americans); Edward Schu-
macher-Matos, How Illegal Immigrants Are Helping Social Security, THE WASH.
POST (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/09/02/AR2010090202673.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/LZ5E-
6HUM.
13. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:3 (2013 ed.), available at
Westlaw STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:3 (2013 ed.) (“In subsequent years [since
2006], the intense political and social controversy over immigration law has lim-
ited Congress to enact virtually no statutory changes to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act. . . .  This has led to some states seeking to address certain aspects of
the immigration laws of the country, especially in the area of enforcement.”).
14. See, e.g., Arizona’s Immigration Frustration, WSJ.COM (Apr. 27, 2010, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703465204575208382473306238
.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TSS8-D3BP; Randal C. Archibold, Ari-
zona Governor Signs Tough Bill on Hiring Illegal Immigrants, NYTIMES.COM
(July 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/03/us/03arizona.html?_r=0,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/G33D-VFM4 (quoting the Governor of Arizona’s
observation that “Congress has failed miserably”).
15. See, e.g., Jon Feer, SCOTUS Ruling on Arizona S.B. 1070 Affirms States Have a
Role to Play on Immigration, POLICYMIC.COM (June 29, 2012), http://www.poli-
cymic.com/articles/10360/scotus-ruling-on-arizona-s-b-1070-affirms-states-have-
a-role-to-play-on-immigration, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/9K3F-6FS4
(“Those who seek continued lax enforcement of immigration laws are generally
hostile to state involvement.”).
16. E-Verify is an Internet-based system for checking the employment eligibility of
immigrants under federal law. See generally E-Verify: Background Information,
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posing civil and criminal sanctions on those who hire undocumented
immigrants.18  Others require proof of lawful presence in the country
on driver’s license applications,19 or tighten federal eligibility require-
ments for access to public benefits.20  Arizona famously has required
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR. (last visited Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nilc.org/
everifyinfo.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/BBU8-CWG2.
17. See, e.g., Act of July 5, 2012, P.L. 1086, 2012 Pa. Laws No. 127 (requiring use of
E-Verify for public works contractors and subcontractors); L.A. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 38:2212.10 (2014) (same for private employers bidding on state contracts); Utah
Immigration Accountability and Enforcement Amendments, ch. 18, 2011 Utah
Laws 228 (codified as amended in scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. titles
63G, 63J, 67, 76, 77 (West 2014)) (same for employers with 15 or more employ-
ees); Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 436, 2011 Tenn. Laws ch. 436 (codified as amended
in scattered section of TENN. CODE ANN. titles 3–8, 12, 39, 50 (West 2014)) (same
in absence of work authorization documents for public employers and private em-
ployers with more than 500 employees); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-11.2 (West 2014)
(same for state agencies), Act of Apr. 8, 2009, LB 403, 2009 Neb. Laws 788 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered section of NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 77 (Reissue 2009))
(same for public agencies and contractors). See also State E-Verify-related Bills,
Laws, Executive Orders, NAT’L IMMIG. L. CENTER, http://www.nilc.org/stateeveri-
fypolicyresrces.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
KL3C-RACG (providing tables and maps surveying state bills related to E-
Verify).
18. See, e.g., Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Part 5(H) (June 21, 2010), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG (criminalizing failure of employers to regis-
ter with E-Verify and to check the status of new employees, and imposing sanc-
tion of business license revocation, cancellation of city contracts, and recalling of
city grants or loans); Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection
Act, No. 535, § 17(b), 2011 Ala. Acts 888, 914 (imposing civil liability for compen-
satory damages on businesses that discharge or fail to hire lawful workers while
retaining or hiring unauthorized workers); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18,
§ 4(B) (Sept. 21, 2006), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/JZP5-E8ZB (criminaliz-
ing and imposing civil liability on businesses hiring unauthorized workers, and
providing the use of E-Verify as a defense).
19. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-1105(a) (West 2014) (requiring proof of citizen-
ship or lawful status to apply for a driver’s license); Act of May 24, 2011, ch. 282,
2011 Or. Laws 928 (codified as amended in scattered sections of OR. REV. STAT.
ch. 807 (2013)) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-328.1 (West 2014) (same); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1080 (2014) (same for licensing and state-issued identifica-
tion); Act of Feb. 11, 2009, ch. 315, 2009 Utah Laws 1489 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. titles 46, 53, 63G (West 2014)) (requiring
lawful status for issuance of driver’s license or identification card).
20. “Unqualified” immigrants are already denied certain benefits under federal law.
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, Title IV, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260–77 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1646 (2012)); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of Omnibus Appropriations Consolidation Act,
1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Title V, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-670–88.  According to the
National Immigration Law Center, the states that have gone beyond federal eligi-
bility mandates as of July, 2011 are Arizona, Utah, Idaho, Colorado, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Montana, Indiana, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia.
State Immigration-Related Legislation: Last Year’s Key Battles Set the Stage for
2012, Laws Requiring Verification of Immigration Status for Public Benefits,
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law enforcement officers to check the immigration status of persons
they suspect of being in the country illegally21 and permitted such
suspicion to be the basis for warrantless detainment.22  Arizona also
imposed criminal sanctions on undocumented immigrants for seeking
employment.23  Several states have proscribed the transit and con-
cealment of undocumented immigrants.24  Another tactic on this
score—and the subject of this Note—are anti-immigrant housing ordi-
nances (AIHOs).25  AIHOs generally require prospective tenants to
apply for and obtain a rental license, then deny these licenses to those
who cannot prove lawful presence in the country.26
The increase in state and local regulation of undocumented immi-
grants has been accompanied by a rise in legal challenges to these
laws.27  Plaintiffs often invoke the due process or equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.28  The most common chal-
lenges, however, have been claims that federal law preempts these
state and local efforts.29  When courts have struck down AIHOs, they
have done so in recognition of the federal government’s preemptive
authority over immigration.30
Federal preemption of state immigration law is a topic of some con-
troversy.  Immigration policies are hotly debated31 and federal pre-
NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., http://www.nilc.org/states-wrapup-2011.html (last
visited Oct. 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/5CSJ-H62Z.
21. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2014). See infra subsection II.C.4.
22. Id. § 13-3883(A)(5) (2014), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012).
23. Id. § 13-2928(C) (2014), invalidated by Arizona, 132 S. Ct. 2492.
24. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-201 (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-9-460
(2013), invalidated by United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir.
2013); Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, No. 535,
§ 13, 2011 Ala. Acts 888, 907-09; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2929 (2014).
25. This term is borrowed from Daniel Eduardo Guzmán, Note, “There Be No Shelter
Here”: Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances and Comprehensive Reform, 20 COR-
NELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399 (2010).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 135–39.
27. See, e.g., Immigration Enforcement-Related Litigation, NAT’L IMMIG. L. CENTER,
http://www.nilc.org/litigationie.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2013), archived at http:/
/perma.unl.edu/LJU8-U7HG; Jerry Markon, Obama Administration Widens
Challenges to State Immigration Laws, WASH. POST (Sept. 29, 2011), http://arti-
cles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-29/politics/35276353_1_immigration-laws-ille-
gal-immigrants-check-immigration-status, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
EYL7-AP46.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Yolanda C. Garcia et al., Where Are Courts
Drawing the Line? The Contours of Preemption and Other Constitutional Bases
for the Enjoinment of Modern State-Propounded Immigration-Related Statutes
and Ordinances, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 91–96 (2011).
29. Garcia et al., supra note 28, at 83 (noting that while these “[c]hallenges . . . often
focus on preemption,” few cases deal with due process or equal protection).
30. See id.; infra section II.D.
31. See, e.g., Courts Block Provisions in Immigration Laws, Lets Some Controversial
Ones Stand, CNN.COM (Aug. 22, 2012, 12:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/
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emption is an unsettled legal doctrine at the heart of perennial issues
of federalism.32  The Eighth Circuit’s split panel decision in Keller v.
City of Fremont33 is quintessential.  The ordinance at the heart of the
case was a subject of contention among Fremont voters and in the me-
dia.34  The decision put the Eighth Circuit in a position at odds with
holdings in the Third,35 Fourth,36 Fifth,37 Ninth,38 and Eleventh Cir-
cuits,39 and produced a strongly worded dissent.40  As such, Keller
provides a useful illustration of federal preemption in the area of im-
migration and AIHOs specifically.
The significance of Keller stems from two aspects of the opinion.
First, it presents a green light to states and municipalities in the
Eighth Circuit to enact AIHOs, ending an unbroken record of success-
20/justice/state-immigration-laws/, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/46ET-ZVC8;
Talk of the Nation: How New Immigration Laws are Changing States, NPR (Apr.
30, 2012, 1:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/30/151700266/how-new-immigra-
tion-laws-are-changing-states, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/TVH5-P3PU;
Why Congress Falters on Immigration, NYTIMES.COM (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www
.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/08/why-cant-congress-act-on-immigration,
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/QAM8-TMRC.
32. JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAWS: LEGISLA-
TION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION 39 (2006) (“Commentators have observed re-
cently that the Supreme Court’s views of preemption are in ‘a time of enormous
flux,’ . . . [and] have suggested that the breadth of the express preemption defense
appears to be narrowing, while the scope of ‘conflict preemption’ seems to be
widening.”) (quoting Betsy J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Pre-
emption of State Tort Remedies, 77 B.U.L. REV. 559, 617 (1997)).  Implied pre-
emption, the form of preemption most often invoked in these challenges, “remains
quite controversial even after years of debate.” Id. at 66.
33. 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014).
34. See, e.g., Margery A. Beck, Nebraska Immigration Law Passes: Special Election
Held in Fremont to Ban Hiring or Renting Property to Illegal Immigrants, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 22, 2010, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/
22/nebraska-immigration-law_n_620528.html, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
YY8Q-FA68; Huma Kahn, Midwest Town Mandates Immigration Check for Rent-
ers, ABC NEWS (June 21, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/immigration-de-
bate-heats-fremont-nebraska/story?id=10972180, archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/LF35-GQGT; Leslie Reed, Foes Say Fight Will Go On Against Fremont’s Ille-
gal-Immigrant Housing Law, OMAHA.COM (June 29, 2013, 1:02 PM), http://www
.omaha.com/article/20130628/NEWS/130629626/1685, archived at http://perma
.unl.edu/W4EC-8SJU; Leslie Reed, City Torn by Immigration Proposal, OMAHA
.COM (June 10, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.omaha.com/article/20100610/NEWS
01/706109891/0, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/F93Y-KZGT.
35. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013).
36. United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013).
37. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tex., 726 F.3d 524 (5th
Cir. 2013).
38. Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013); Garrett v. City of
Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
39. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
40. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 953–60 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2140 (2014) (J. Bright, dissenting).
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ful challenges to these laws nationwide.  As one commentator has
noted, the doctrine of federal preemption does not necessarily provide
a sufficiently predictable legal tool for challenging AIHOs.41  But pre-
emption has, until Keller, proved to be an effective and consistently
successful basis for striking down these laws.  By upholding Fremont’s
ordinance, Keller clears a path for cities and states to remove undocu-
mented immigrants from their borders by precluding them from enter-
ing into private contracts for housing.42
Second, Keller is significant because the language of the ordinance
at issue is substantially identical to AIHOs struck down by other cir-
cuits.  Fremont did not discover a new way to write AIHOs that satis-
fied the objections of the courts.  Instead, the Eighth Circuit adopted a
narrow view of federal preemptive authority over immigration and
characterized the AIHO at issue as nothing more than a “local prop-
erty licensing scheme.”43  Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit based its
view in part on a heightened standard for preemption which was inap-
plicable and which the court did not make an effort to justify.44
This Note argues the Fremont ordinance, and other AIHOs, should
be federally preempted.  Part II reviews the doctrine of federal pre-
emption and describes the historic recognition of federal authority
over immigration.  It also summarizes Supreme Court case law on im-
migration and preemption, lower court decisions on AIHOs, and the
Keller decision.  Part III argues for preemption of the Fremont
ordinance.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Preemption
Federal preemption arises as a necessary consequence of the dual
sovereignty of state and federal governments, and the primacy of fed-
eral law in particular areas.45  Thus, “in cases of concurrent authority,
41. Citing cases in Pennsylvania and Texas where housing ordinances similar to
Fremont’s were federally preempted, Professor Rigel Oliveri noted that
“[a]lthough it is tempting for immigrant rights advocates to take solace in these
two district court opinions and assume that preemption doctrine will thwart fur-
ther municipal attempts at passing [anti-illegal immigrant] housing ordinances,
preemption is a risky and unsatisfying approach for several reasons.” Rigel C.
Oliveri, Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Landlords, Latinos, Anti-Illegal Im-
migrant Ordinances, and Housing Discrimination, 62 VAND. L. REV. 55, 68
(2009).
42. See infra section II.E.
43. Keller, 719 F.3d at 943.
44. See infra Part III.A.
45. See generally O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 29–34.  Preemption cases are most often
based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, but some have criticized this,
arguing that preemption and supremacy are distinct concepts. Id. at 30–31; see
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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where the laws of the States and of the Union are in direct and mani-
fest collision on the same subject, those of the Union, being the su-
preme law of the land, are of paramount authority.”46  Federal law—
the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties—preempts expressly
or by implication.47  Both express and implied preemption often stem
from a judicial assessment of what Congress has purposed.48 Express
preemption occurs when Congress, pursuant to its Constitutional au-
thority, unequivocally states its intent that state governments refrain
from regulating in a particular area.49
Federal law preempts by implication where the courts infer that
an entire subject area, or “field,” is to be occupied by federal law to the
exclusion of the states, or where compliance with a state law directly
conflicts with federal law.50  The first of these implied forms of pre-
emption—the inference that federal law occupies a field (field preemp-
tion)—may arise from federal legislation or administrative regulation.
If a federal statutory or regulatory scheme is sufficiently “pervasive,”
a judge may infer Congress did not intend to allow state law to operate
in that field.51  Where field preemption applies, states may not supple-
ment federal law, even where a state law is in harmony with federal
law.52  This is because where a statutory framework achieves policy
46. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1820).
47. See generally O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 69–78.  Note that the taxonomical
breakdown of terminology may differ slightly from author to author.
48. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“ ‘[T]he purpose of Congress
is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-emption case.”) (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
49. An example of this type of preemption can be seen in the area of immigrant em-
ployment.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 provides: “The provi-
sions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal
sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who em-
ploy, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.”  Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1965 § 274A(h)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2012).
Express preemption is not currently applicable to regulation of immigrant hous-
ing, and so will not be discussed further in this Note.
50. O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 69–78.  The Supreme Court summarized preemption
by implication in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.:
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reason-
able the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it.  Or the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal
interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to pre-
clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.  Likewise, the ob-
ject sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of
obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.  Or the state
policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal
statute.
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citations omitted).
51. See O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 72–75.
52. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012) (“Field preemp-
tion reflects a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area,
even if it is parallel to federal standards.”); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497,
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objectives through a balancing of incentives and disincentives, the ab-
sence of a provision may be as important to achieving those objectives
as positive law; Congress’s prerogative to set policy in a field precludes
state supplementation.53
The inference that federal law occupies a field may also arise from
either the Constitution’s delegation of power from the states to the
federal government or as a function of federal sovereignty.54  In this
case, preemption arises as a result of the federal structure and so  may
be termed “structural preemption.”55  Structural preemption is an in-
herent aspect of federalism and so, in theory, would turn on the courts’
interpretation of the Constitution or of national sovereignty rather
than on Congressional intent.
The second form of implied preemption arises where there is a con-
flict in complying with both state and federal law.  Conflict preemp-
tion operates where compliance with both state and federal law is not
possible, and in this situation is termed “impossibility conflict preemp-
tion.”56  Conflict preemption also operates where compliance with
state law would present an obstacle to whatever goal federal law is
attempting to achieve, and is then termed “obstacle conflict preemp-
tion.”57  Where there is an allegation of obstacle conflict preemption, a
state cannot necessarily defeat the allegation by claiming it aims to
achieve federal objectives by its own distinct methods.58  Differing
methods may impede federal objectives as well as differing policy
goals.59  Conflict preemption turns less on Congress’s intent to pre-
504 (1956) (determining federal sedition acts “evince a congressional plan which
makes it reasonable to determine that no room has been left for the States to
supplement it”).
53. See sources cited supra note 52.
54. See O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 77 (referring to this as “direct constitutional
preemption”).
55. Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Federalism Post-Arizona, AM. CONST.
SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/immigration-
federalism-post-arizona#_ftnref1, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/4Z6B-5UPS
(referring to a “structural or sovereignty-based form of preemption”).
56. Federal and state law may conflict where compliance is not strictly impossible,
but highly impractical (such as a business activity mandated by federal law
where compliance with a state price-setting requirement would “trap” the busi-
ness’s costs).  O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 73–74 (citing Miss. Power v. Miss. ex
rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988)).  Courts are obligated to attempt to reconcile
potentially conflicting federal and state laws. Id. at 74.
57. Determination of this form of preemption is, to some extent, a subjective inquiry.
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (“What
is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of judgment.”); O’REILLY, supra note 32, at
74–76.
58. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (“The Court has recognized that a ‘[c]onflict in
technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in
overt policy.’”) (quoting Motor Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287
(1971)).
59. Id.
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empt than on the need for federal law to function and to effectuate
Congress’s policy objectives.60
An important caveat to the preemption taxonomy is the presump-
tion against preemption in areas that fall within the states’ historic
police powers.61  States, under their police powers, may regulate for
the health, safety, general welfare, or morals of their populations.62
Congress must show a “clear and manifest purpose” to preempt state
action when attempting to regulate within these areas.63  This height-
ened clear and manifest purpose standard is seen as protecting the
“federalism bargain,” wherein states agreed to cede some part of their
sovereignty but not others.64
B. Federal Authority in the Area of Immigration
The federal government’s authority over immigration is based on
powers delegated to it by the Constitution and on its exclusive com-
mand over foreign affairs.65  This authority has a long historical pedi-
gree; the Supreme Court has consistently noted the plenary nature of
60. O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 73.
61. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“Congress legis-
lated here in field which the States have traditionally occupied. So we start with
the assumption that the historic powers of the States were not to be superseded
by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”)
(citations omitted); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“First, be-
cause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of
action.”).
62. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 344 (2013).
63. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
64. O’REILLY, supra note 32, at 7–8.  Whether the presumption against preemption is
still truly extant is a subject of some controversy. See, e.g., United States v.
Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (acknowledging presumption and finding it does
not apply in areas historically regulated by the federal government); Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (applying presumption). But see, e.g.,
O’REILLY supra note 32, at 8 (“[T]he Supreme Court has ignored the presumption
in some recent cases . . . .”) (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505
U.S. 88 (1992)); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in favor of Preemp-
tion, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 968 (2002) (“Historically, the Supreme Court has said
. . . there is a presumption against preemption.  There is no such presumption
any longer, if, indeed, there ever really was one.”).  This debate is beyond the
scope of this Note.  Several of the relevant cases discussed treat the presumption
as alive and well, and this Note will do the same.
65. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012) (“This authority rests in
part, on the National Government’s constitutional power to ‘establish an uniform
Rule of Naturalization,’ and its inherent power as sovereign to control and con-
duct relations with foreign nations.”) (citations omitted); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941) (“That the supremacy of the national power in the general
field of foreign affairs, including power over immigration, naturalization and de-
portation, is made clear by the Constitution was pointed out by authors of The
Federalist in 1787, and has since been given continuous recognition by this
Court.”).
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Congress’s authority to exclude and expel non-citizens since the
1880s.66  Congress has used this authority to extensively regulate im-
migration, and its exclusivity is well-settled.67
1. The Naturalization Clause, Foreign Affairs, and Foreign
Commerce
The Constitution gives Congress the power through the Naturali-
zation Clause “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.”68
Because the central objective of this power is uniformity, it must be an
exclusive power; if each State were left to determine its own naturali-
zation policy, such uniformity would be unachievable.69  Immigration
policy also touches on foreign affairs and international commerce
through the exclusion and expulsion of non-citizens.70  The federal
government’s power in the arena of foreign affairs is an inherent as-
pect of the sovereignty of the national government,71 and the authors
of the Federalist papers noted the federal government’s authority over
66. See MILTON R. KONVITZ, CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION 1–3 (1953).
67. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) (“Power to regulate immigration is
unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”).
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
69. James Madison observed that a person unfit for nation-wide citizenship under
the laws of one state, could acquire that citizenship under the laws of a different
state with more lenient criteria. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 276–77 (James
Madison) (Nat’l Found. for Educ. in Am. Citizenship 1937) (1788).
70. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (“Immigration policy can affect trade, investment,
tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire Nation . . . .”); Chy Lung v. Free-
man, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (“The passage of laws which concern the admission
of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and
not to the States. . . .  If it be otherwise, a State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in
disastrous quarrels.”); Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, 66
HARV. L. REV. 643, 681 (1953) (“The source of the power to deport aliens has been
found in the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce and in the sover-
eignty of the national Government with respect to foreign affairs.”).
71. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (“The powers to de-
clare war, make treaties, suppress insurrection, repel invasion, regulate foreign
commerce, secure republican governments to the states, and admit subjects of
other nations to citizenship, are all sovereign powers, restricted in their exercise
only by the [C]onstitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice
which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”).
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foreign relations should be exclusive.72  The power to regulate foreign
commerce is given to Congress in the Constitution.73
2. Congressional Enactments
Congress exercised its powers over naturalization as early as 1790
with the Naturalization Act.74  The Alien and Sedition Acts of the
1790s75 made the then-controversial attempt to allow the national
government to remove aliens.76  Congress did not pass an immigration
statute excluding foreigners again until 1862.77  Congress has regu-
larly exercised its authority since that time,78 and passed its most
comprehensive immigration legislation with the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952 (INA).79  That Act set parameters gov-
erning preference for and exclusion of immigrants, the issuance of
visas, and inspection upon entry.80  It also set in place rules, proce-
dures, and exceptions for deportation hearings.81  The INA has been
amended a number of times since 1952,82 but still “continues to be the
basic immigration statute.”83  Subsequent major pieces of legislation
72. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 14 (John Jay) (Nat’l Found. for Educ. in Am.
Citizenship 1937) (1788) (“It is of high importance to the peace of America that
she observe the laws of nations toward all these powers, and to me it appears
evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national gov-
ernment than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four
distinct confederacies.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 517 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Nat’l Found. for Educ. in Am. Citizenship 1937) (1788) (“[T]he peace of the
WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART.  The Union will undoubtedly
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members.”).
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
74. Naturalization Act, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790) (restricting naturalization to whites
who resided in the United States for at least two years).
75. Naturalization Act, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566 (1798); Alien Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798);
Alien Enemies Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 21–24 (2012)).
76. See e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2512 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he controversy surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts involved a de-
bate over whether, under the Constitution, the States had exclusive authority to
enact such immigration laws); Jelte Olthof, History As Our Guide?: The Past As
an Invisible Source of Constitutionality in the Legislative Debates on the Alien Act
in the United States (1798) and the Émigrés Problem in France (1791), 57 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 377, 385 (2013) (“Following the Tenth Amendment . . . the compe-
tence to remove aliens clearly rested with the states, not the federal
government.”).
77. Anti-Coolie Act, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340 (1862) (preventing the importation of Chi-
nese slave labor).
78. See JACK WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 611–18 (3d ed. 1979).
79. Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended
in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012)).
80. See STEEL, supra note 13, § 1:2.
81. Id.
82. Id. § 1:3.
83. Id. § 1:2.
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in the area of immigration include the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act of 1986;84 the Immigration Act of 1990;85 the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996;86 and the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996.87
The combination of the preemption taxonomy, the state police
power presumption, and federal authority over immigration presents
an outline of the doctrine of federal preemption in the context of immi-
gration.  If a state attempts to regulate core aspects of immigration
such as naturalization, exclusion (admission), or expulsion (removal),
that attempt is structurally preempted under the federal govern-
ment’s exclusive constitutional and sovereign powers.  Outside of this
core area, federal statutes that take immigration as their subject may
preempt state law where Congress is so-authorized and when it in-
tends such a result.  Such intent can be shown where the federal law
occupies a field in which the state law operates and thus precludes
even harmonious state regulation.  The courts may also preempt state
law where it conflicts with federal law, either in compliance, objec-
tives, or means of achievement.  The showing of congressional intent
must meet a heightened standard of a clear and manifest purpose—
rebutting the presumption against preemption—for federal law to pre-
empt a field within the states’ historic police powers.
C. Supreme Court Immigration Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has taken up the issue of federal authority
over immigration extensively since the late 19th Century.  It has at-
tempted to delineate core immigration areas reserved to the federal
government and to articulate the preemptive scope of federal statutes.
These issues are far from fully resolved, but the Court has provided
some guidelines along the way.
1. Early Supreme Court Cases
Chy Lung v. Freeman88 presents one of the earliest examples of the
Supreme Court’s recognition of structural preemption.  The Court in
Chy Lung struck down a California statute that allowed a local “Com-
missioner of Immigration” to deny entry to certain classes of foreign-
ers entering San Francisco by ship.89  This effectively gave the
84. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (amending the INA).
85. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (amending the INA).
86. Enacted as Division C of Omnibus Appropriations Consolidation Act, 1997, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
87. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1601–1646 (2012)).
88. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
89. Id.
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Commissioner discretion to determine who could enter the country.90
The Court held “[t]he passage of laws which concern the admission of
citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Con-
gress, and not to the States. . . .  If it be otherwise, a State can, at her
pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels.”91  The Court here gives
an important justification for the supremacy of federal over state im-
migration law—that the treatment of foreign nationals by one state
can produce repercussions for which the entire nation must answer.92
Another early Supreme Court case that dealt with federal author-
ity over immigration was The Chinese Exclusion Case.93  The plaintiff
was a Chinese laborer who left the United States to visit China in
1887.94  His certificate of reentry was voided under a federal statute
during his absence, and he was detained when he attempted to reen-
ter in San Francisco.95  On a writ of habeas corpus, the Court evalu-
ated Congress’s authority to enact the statute.96  It noted the
inherently national nature of foreign affairs97 and the federal govern-
ment’s duty to “give security against foreign aggression and encroach-
ment.”98  Thus, the Court concluded, this national authority over
foreign affairs must include the power of exclusion.99  The Court held
the “power of exclusion of foreigners” was “incident of sovereignty be-
longing to the government of the United States as a part of those sov-
ereign powers delegated by the constitution.”100  Five years later in
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court conceived of this power to
exclude foreigners as also including the power to expel them.101  In
Fok Young Yo v. United States, this power was extended to the privi-
lege of transit.102
90. Id.
91. Id. at 280.
92. See Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 72.
93. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581
(1889).
94. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 590–603.
97. Id. at 604 (“While under our constitution and form of government the great mass
of local matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their rela-
tion to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation . . . .”).
98. Id. at 606.
99. Id. at 606–09.
100. Id. at 609.
101. 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who
have not been naturalized, or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the
country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified, as the
right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”).
102. 185 U.S. 296, 302–03 (1902) (“The doctrine is firmly established that the power to
exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the government,
to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the execu-
tive authority according to such regulations, except so far as the judicial depart-
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2. Hines v. Davidowitz
The Supreme Court handed down a now-seminal instance of im-
plied preemption of a state immigration law in Hines v. Davido-
witz.103 In Hines, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute that
required aliens to register annually with the State and to carry a re-
gistration card at all times.104  The Court invoked the Supremacy
Clause, the federal government’s authority over foreign affairs, and
the Naturalization Clause in concluding the Alien Registration Act of
1940105 preempted the Pennsylvania statute.106  The Alien Registra-
tion Act and its legislative history demonstrated Congressional intent
to have in place only a single “integrated and all-embracing system” of
immigrant registration.107  Congress intended “to protect the personal
liberties of law-abiding aliens through one uniform national registra-
tion system”—a purpose to which the Pennsylvania statute proved an
obstacle.108
3. DeCanas v. Bica
DeCanas v. Bica109 took up state regulation of immigrant employ-
ment and provided a limiting view of the scope of the preemptive
power of federal immigration law.110  California passed a law prohib-
iting employers from hiring undocumented immigrants if “such em-
ployment would have an adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”111
The Court noted the exclusively federal nature of the power to regu-
late immigration, but found that the statute was not within the scope
of that power.112  In oft-quoted language, the Court specified that a
state only regulates immigration—thereby invading federal powers—
when that regulation is “essentially a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under
which a legal entrant may remain.”113  It determined California was
not regulating immigration directly, but was merely making an effort
ment is authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to
intervene.  And as a general proposition this must be true of the privilege of
transit.” (citations omitted)).
103. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
104. Id. at 60.
105. Pub. L. No. 670, 54 Stat. 670 (repealed 1952).
106. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62–63.
107. Id. at 74.
108. Id.
109. 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
110. DeCanas is seen as part of an effort by the Burger Court to provide uniformity to
application of the preemption doctrine in a manner more permissive to state leg-
islation. See Robert S. Catz & Howard B. Lenard, The Demise of the Implied
Federal Preemption Doctrine, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 320 (1977).
111. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 352.
112. Id. at 355.
113. Id.  This language provides a test that has been cited in nearly every AIHO case.
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to “strengthen its economy” in a way that incidentally touched on
immigration.114  Additionally, the Court found the law was within
California’s police powers because it “focuse[d] directly upon . . . essen-
tially local problems and [was] tailored to combat effectively the per-
ceived evils.”115  The Court concluded neither the language, legislative
history, nor scope of the INA evinced the “clear and manifest purpose”
standard needed to preempt the California statute.116
4. Arizona v. United States
The Court handed down its most recent decision on preemption of
state immigration law in Arizona v. United States.117  In so doing, it
struck down three provisions of an Arizona statute,118 declining to en-
join a fourth under a facial challenge.119  The Court looked first to § 3
of the law, which imposed criminal penalties on undocumented immi-
grants who failed to carry registration documents.120  Analogizing to
Hines, the Court found this provision field preempted by the compre-
hensive nature of federal laws governing alien registration.121  The
federal scheme “provide[d] a full set of standards” and “was designed
as a ‘harmonious whole.’”122  Such a scheme “reflect[ed] a congres-
sional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it
is parallel to federal standards.”123
The Court next addressed § 5(C) of the Arizona law, which imposed
criminal penalties on undocumented immigrants for applying for,
soliciting, or performing work as either an employee or a contrac-
tor.124  The Court found the absence of criminal penalties on immi-
grant employees in federal law was a deliberate determination by
Congress that such “penalties would be ‘unnecessary and unwork-
able.’”125  Thus, Arizona’s criminal penalties presented an obstacle to
114. Id.
115. Id. at 357.
116. Id. at 357–58.
117. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
118. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010).
119. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507–11.  The Court found “[i]t was improper . . . to enjoin
§ 2(B) [of Arizona’s statute] before the state courts had an opportunity to con-
strue it and without some showing that enforcement of the provision in fact con-
flicts with federal immigration law and its objectives.” Id. at 2510.
120. Id. at 2501–03.
121. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.
122. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2503–05.
125. Id. at 2504 (quoting U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST: THE
FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRA-
TION AND REFUGEE POLICY WITH SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS BY COMMISSIONERS 66
(1981)).
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the balancing of legal burdens on immigrants through which Congress
achieved its policy objectives.126
The Court also used obstacle conflict preemption to strike down § 6
of the Arizona law.127  That provision authorized state officers to
make warrantless arrests of persons they had probable cause to be-
lieve had committed a public offense that would make that person re-
movable.128  Noting that “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a
removable alien to remain present in the United States,” the Court
found Arizona’s law allowed state officers to make their own determi-
nation of whether a suspect was possibly removable.129  This discre-
tion was beyond the scope of what was delegated to state officers
under federal law.130  The Court used language, however, implying
the law was also invalid under structural preemption, as an inappro-
priate usurpation of the power of removal by Arizona.131
The Supreme Court’s earliest immigration cases preempted state
law under the federal government’s delegated Constitutional powers,
vindicating those powers with relatively broad language.  Since then,
the Court has shifted toward a preference for preempting state immi-
gration laws under federal statutes.132  In cases where state laws
could be structurally preempted, the Court has preferred instead to
use narrower statutory grounds.133 Chy Lung, The Chinese Exclusion
Case, Fong Yue Ting, and Fok Young Yo, however, remain good law
and support structural preemption as a viable mechanism in striking
down state immigration laws.134  As discussed below, lower courts too
have tended to focus on preemption under federal statutes.
D. Lower Court Decisions on AIHOs
Several circuit decisions have recently addressed preemption of
AIHOs specifically.  AIHOs generally operate by requiring prospective
tenants of rented housing to pay a small fee and apply for an occu-
pancy permit.135  The tenant must provide requested information, in-
126. Id. at 2505.
127. Id. at 2507.
128. Id. at 2505.
129. Id. at 2505–06.
130. Id.
131. “A decision on removability requires a determination whether it is appropriate to
allow a foreign national to continue living in the United States. Decisions of this
nature touch on foreign relations and must be made with one voice.” Id. at
2506–07 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
132. See Gulasekaram, supra note 55.
133. Id.
134. See supra subsection II.C.1 and notes 93, 101.
135. See, Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Parts 2–4 (June 21, 2010), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952, §§ 1,
3 (Jan. 22, 2008), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3CAH-587P; Hazleton, Pa.,
Ordinance 2006-18, § 5 (Sept. 21, 2006), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N75C-
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cluding identification that proves citizenship or lawful status.136  An
occupancy permit is automatically issued upon completion of an appli-
cation, but if the tenant does not provide proof of citizenship or lawful
status, city authorities check with federal authorities for a determina-
tion of the tenant’s immigration status.137  If the check reveals a ten-
ant is not lawfully present, the occupancy permit is revoked, and the
landlord is liable for fines or revocation of his or her license to rent if
he or she does not promptly evict the unlicensed tenant.138  The land-
lord’s liability arises from a provision that criminalizes the act of har-
boring undocumented immigrants.139  Such harboring includes
leasing property to those not lawfully present in the country and
Fremont’s AIHO makes lawful presence a condition precedent to en-
tering into a lease.140
As the decisions discussed below illustrate,141 lower courts have
been almost unanimous in their determination that AIHOs are at
odds with federal law.142  This has been paralleled in decisions strik-
4TXW; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 7(b) (Aug. 15, 2006), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/J3SE-42W2.
136. See, Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Part 3(B), (E) (June 21, 2010), archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952,
§§ 1(B)(2), (5); 3(B)(2), (5) (Jan. 22, 2008), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
3CAH-587P; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, § 7(b) (Aug. 15, 2006), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/J3SE-42W2.
137. See, Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Part 4(A) (June 21, 2010), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952,
§§ 1(D)(1); 3(D)(1) (Jan. 22, 2008), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3CAH-587P;
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 5(B)(3) (Sept. 21, 2006), archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/N75C-4TXW.
138. See, Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Parts 3(j), 4(B), (D) (June 21, 2010),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance
2952, §§ 1(C)(7), 1(D)(4)–(5); 3(C)(7), 3(D)(4)–(5) (Jan. 22, 2008), archived at http:/
/perma.unl.edu/3CAH-587P; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 5(B)(4)–(6), (8)
(Sept. 21, 2006), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N75C-4TXW; Hazleton, Pa.,
Ordinance 2006-13, § 10(b) (Aug. 15, 2006), archived at http://perma.unl.edu/
J3SE-42W2.
139. See, Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Part 2(A) (June 21, 2010), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG; Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2952,
§§ 1(C)(7), 1(D)(4); 3(C)(7), 3(D)(4) (Jan. 22, 2008), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/3CAH-587P; Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, § 5 (Sept. 21, 2006),
archived at http://perma.unl.edu/N75C-4TXW.
140. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, § 1, Part 2(A)(2) (June 21, 2010), archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG.
141. See infra subsections II.D.1–2.
142. See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1288 (11th Cir. 2012) (finding state
anti-harboring law including a prohibition on renting to undocumented immi-
grants “effectuate[d] an untenable expansion of the federal harboring provision”);
Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (granting
temporary restraining order on anti-harboring provision proscribing leasing to
undocumented immigrants on likelihood it was field and conflict preempted
under INA); Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, Mo., No. 06-CC-3802, 2007 WL
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ing down or enjoining state anti-harboring laws.143  The reasoning
and particular forms of preemption these decisions utilize, however,
are less than consistent.
1. Lozano v. City of Hazleton
The Third Circuit has twice struck down as preempted a pair of
2006 Hazleton, Pennsylvania ordinances that include anti-immigrant
housing provisions.144  The court examined the Hazleton ordinances
for the first time in Lozano I and found the housing provisions struc-
turally preempted, statutorily field preempted, and obstacle conflict
preempted.145  The court rested the findings of both structural and
field preemption on the “conclusion that Hazleton’s housing provisions
regulate which aliens may live there.”146  It began by concluding the
police power presumption did not apply.147  The court then reasoned
that because Hazleton attempted, through the ordinances, to remove
undocumented immigrants from its borders, the ordinances essen-
tially expelled non-citizens and so intruded on a core area of immigra-
857320 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2007 (finding local prohibition on leasing to undocu-
mented immigrants preempted by state law).
143. This class of state statutes generally prohibits, and provides penalties for, trans-
porting, concealing, harboring, or shielding undocumented immigrants, or en-
couraging undocumented immigrants to enter the country, and allows for state
officials to arrest and prosecute violations of these laws.  They are generally
struck down under the INA’s anti-harboring provision which not only provides a
full set of standards for immigrant harboring, but limits the role of state officials
to arresting violators, rather than prosecuting them. See Valle del Sol, Inc. v.
Whiting, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding state anti-harboring provisions
field and conflict preempted by the INA); United States v. South Carolina, 720
F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Gover-
nor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012) (likelihood of the same for preliminary
injunction); Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (finding state anti-harboring law expressly,
field, and conflict preempted and using language indicating structural preemp-
tion as well).
144. Lozano v. City of Hazleton (Lozano I), 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated and
remanded in light of Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 2958
(2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). Lozano I was
vacated because the part of that decision dealing with immigrant employment
was affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.
v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).  Unsurprisingly, then, the Third Circuit main-
tained its position on the housing provisions upon rehearing.  Lozano v. City of
Hazleton (Lozano II), 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013).
145. Lozano I, 620 F.3d at 219–24.
146. Id. at 220.
147. Id. (“Although we realize that a state certainly can, and presumably should, regu-
late rental accommodations to ensure the health and safety of its re-
sidents, . . . Hazleton attempts to regulate residence based solely on immigration
status.  Deciding which aliens may live in the United States has always been the
prerogative of the federal government.”).
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tion.148  Additionally, the comprehensive nature of the INA “plainly
precludes state efforts, whether harmonious or conflicting, to regulate
residence in this country.”149
In holding the Hazleton housing provisions conflict preempted, the
court introduced what may be termed the “snapshot” argument.150
Federal immigration status is dynamic; an immigrant’s status is sub-
ject to change until the Immigration and Naturalization Service un-
dertakes removal proceedings.151  There are procedural protections
and exceptions that may apply to a decision about removal,152 and
that decision lies solely within the discretion of the federal govern-
ment.153  Although an immigrant may have status indicating he or
she is not lawfully present at a moment in time, it is only after a fed-
eral removal hearing that it is possible to know whether the federal
government has attempted to initiate removal proceedings.154  Thus,
state laws that base removal from the city on a person’s federal immi-
gration status at a particular point in time—on a “snapshot” of their
status—conflict with the fluid nature of federal removal proceedings
and Congress’s determination that fluidity best strikes the correct bal-
ance of policy outcomes.155  The court also found the ordinances’ use of
the term “harboring” conflicted with the INA because “[t]he federal
prohibition against harboring has never been interpreted to apply so
broadly as to encompass the typical landlord/tenant relationship.”156
The Third Circuit reevaluated the case in Lozano II after the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Arizona.157  Regarding the housing provi-
sions, the court found “the Court’s language [in Arizona] reinforce[d]
[its] view.”158  It preempted Hazleton’s ordinance on each of the same
148. Id.  “We also recognize that Hazleton’s housing provisions regulate presence only
within its city limits, not the entire country.  This does not change the analysis.
To be meaningful, the federal government’s exclusive control over residence in
this country must extend to any political subdivision.”  Id. at 221.
149. Id. at 220.
150. Id. at 221.
151. INA § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C) (2012) (providing limited circum-
stances in which an order for removal may be rescinded).
152. See sources cited infra notes 281, 283–84.
153. INA § 240(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2012) (“Unless otherwise specified in this
Act, a proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States or, if the
alien has been so admitted, removed from the United States.”).  Removable un-
documented immigrants were never admitted in the first place, but INA
§ 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (2012), identifies as a deportable class those
aliens who at the time of entry into the country were inadmissible—a determina-
tion exclusive to the Federal government.
154. Lozano I, 620 F.3d at 222.
155. Id. at 221–22.
156. Id. at 223.
157. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
158. Lozano II, 724 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2013).
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grounds as used in Lozano I and also found the ordinances field pre-
empted on a basis not discussed in Lozano I.159  A series of recent de-
cisions in the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits160 persuaded the court
the ordinances also entered the occupied field of immigrant
harboring.161
2. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch
The Fifth Circuit also found an AIHO preempted in Villas at Park-
side Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Texas (Farmers Branch I).162
The court in Farmers Branch I found the police power presumption
inapplicable and held the ordinance preempted on each of the same
grounds as in Lozano I.163  On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed in Farmers Branch II, but significantly narrowed the
grounds for preemption.164  The plurality in Farmers Branch II was
silent on structural and field preemption and instead relied solely on
conflict preemption.165
The Farmers Branch II court first observed that the ordinance en-
forced the INA’s anti-harboring provision.  But by criminalizing the
mere act by a landlord of renting to an undocumented immigrant, the
ordinance did not include—as the INA does—a mens rea element or a
requirement that one shield an undocumented immigrant from fed-
eral authorities.166  In fact, the court noted, federal law contemplates
residency by undocumented immigrants for purposes of service, and
thus the anti-harboring provisions of the Farmers Branch ordinance
“not only fail[ed] to facilitate, but obstruct[ed] the goal of bringing po-
tentially removable non-citizens to the attention of the federal author-
ities.”167  Furthermore, by allowing state officers to prosecute
landlords for the federal crime of harboring, the ordinance allowed
state officers to act as federal immigration officers in a manner not
authorized under the INA.168  These inconsistencies interfered with
the delicate balance of federal priorities contained in the INA.169
159. Id. at 314–21.
160. See cases cited supra note 143.
161. Lozano II, 724 F.3d at 316–17.
162. 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013).
163. Farmers Branch I, 675 F.3d at 807–16.
164. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Famers Branch, Tex. (Farmers Branch II),
726 F.3d 524, 528–37 (5th Cir. 2013).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 529–30.
167. Id. at 530.
168. Id. at 530–31.  As noted by the court here and in Arizona, federal immigration
law allows state officers to perform the duties of federal immigration officers in a
narrow set of circumstances, none here apposite. See INA § 287(g)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(g)(1) (2012); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).
169. Farmers Branch II, 726 F.3d at 530–31.
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Second, the court found the ordinance’s criminalization of tenancy
without a permit conflict preempted because it “predicate[d] arrests,
detentions, and prosecutions based on a classification—the ability to
obtain rental housing—that does not exist under [8 U.S.C.] § 1621 or
anywhere else in federal law.”170  The ordinance purported to aid in
the enforcement of § 1621, which denies state and local public benefits
to “unqualified” immigrants.171  The city argued that all licenses, in-
cluding the proposed occupancy permits in the ordinance, were among
the public benefits denied to undocumented immigrants under § 1621,
and so the ordinance’s criminal penalties—including arrest, deten-
tion, and prosecution by the state—aided in the enforcement of federal
objectives.172  No federal designation of immigration status, however,
is identified in federal law as a basis for precluding immigrants from
renting housing.173
Furthermore, of the many possible immigration classifications that
exist under federal law, none are specifically identified by the ordi-
nance as indicating an immigrant is unlawfully present.174  Given this
ambiguity, state officials would be left to make a determination—
based on whatever federal designation they receive in response to an
inquiry—as to whether a person is lawfully present, and may then
arrest, detain, and prosecute an undocumented immigrant based on
that determination.175  By requiring state officials to make this deter-
mination, the Farmers Branch ordinance “would allow the State to
achieve its own immigration policy” and would thereby “disrupt the
federal framework.”176
Lastly, the court struck down a provision of the ordinance granting
state judicial review to landlords and occupants.177  Unless a federal
immigration status would conclusively define an immigrant as law-
fully or unlawfully present—something federal designation of status
cannot always do—the state court would be left to make the determi-
nation, “opening the door to conflicting state and federal rulings on
the question.”178  The court determined that these conflict-preempted
170. Id. at 532.
171. Id. at 531–32;
172. Id. at 531–32.
173. Id. at 532.
174. Id.  “The Ordinance’s ‘generality stands at odds with the federal discreteness.’”
Id. at 533 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 379
(2000)).  The city proposed to use the SAVE program (a federal program used to
identify immigrants qualified to receive public assistance) to make its determina-
tion, but the head of the SAVE program testified that it does not identify whether
a person’s presence is lawful. Id.
175. Id. at 534–35.
176. Id. at 535 (quoting Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506, 2509 (2012)).
177. Id. at 536–37.
178. Id. at 536.
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provisions were not severable and so struck down the entire
ordinance.179
Lozano II and Farmers Branch II have lent some certainty to the
question of AIHOs’ validity.  But these decisions have not taken a uni-
form path and leave room for uncertainty as to the application of the
preemption doctrine by the courts.  Conflict preemption appears to be
the form most often relied-upon, but as Hazleton demonstrates, others
forms remain viable.  Notably, neither circuit’s decisions relied on
structural preemption, although language in Arizona suggests that
structural preemption is still an extant legal theory.  Whatever cer-
tainty does exist, however, has been diminished by the Eight Circuit’s
recent decision on a Fremont, Nebraska AIHO.
E. Keller v. City of Fremont
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Keller v. City of Fremont180 put an
end to AIHOs’ track record of preemption. In reversing the district
court, the split three-judge panel held that no form of preemption ap-
plied to the Fremont ordinance (the Ordinance) and acknowledged its
disagreement with the Third and Fifth Circuits.181  First, the court
reasoned that structural preemption did not apply because the Ordi-
nance did not enter the core immigration area of removal.182  It distin-
guished between removal of aliens from the country, and “[l]aws
designed to deter, or even prohibit, unlawfully present aliens from re-
siding within a particular locality.”183
The court next addressed statutory field preemption, concluding
that the Ordinance did not enter the field of alien registration or anti-
harboring laws.184  The court reasoned that because the Ordinance
“does not apply to all aliens,” excluding those who do not rent, it is
unlike the sort of registration schemes preempted in Hines and Ari-
zona.185  If the Ordinance enters this field, the court speculated, then
driver’s licenses too could be seen as a preempted alien registration
program.186  As to the anti-harboring provision, the court relied on
179. Id. at 538–39.
180. 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014).
181. Id. at 939–45.
182. Id. at 942 (“The rental provisions do not remove aliens from this country (or even
the City), nor do they create a parallel local process to determine an alien’s
removability.”).
183. Id. at 941.  This will be referred to later in this Note as the Keller “locality
distinction.”
184. Id. at 942–43.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 493.  Lozano II countered this argument:  “Basing eligibility for certain
state privileges on immigration status is distinct from requiring aliens to regis-
ter.” Lozano II, 724 F.3d 297, 322 (3d Cir. 2013).
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language in DeCanas invoking the “clear and manifest purpose”187
standard for areas within the states’ historic police powers.188  Addi-
tionally, the court found that the Ordinance’s definition of harboring
“does not purport to enforce the federal anti-harboring prohibition,”
and so does not conflict with federal law’s narrower definition.189
Turning lastly to conflict preemption, the court found its earlier
conclusion that the Ordinance did not effectuate removal of undocu-
mented immigrants instructive.190  It reasoned that because the Ordi-
nance does not remove anyone, there is no conflict with the federal
scheme.191  The court found “federal immigration officials retain com-
plete discretion to decide whether and when to pursue removal pro-
ceedings,” and the fact that no federal status designation would
conclusively indicate an immigrant was “lawfully present” did not pre-
sent a conflict because “the federal government has complete power to
avoid the conflict.”192
The Keller court was particularly wary of “expansive” notions of
preemption, and it characterized the Ordinance as a local licensing
scheme for housing within the municipality’s police powers.193  It also
noted Supreme Court dicta indicating that states may take action to
deter undocumented immigrants.194  But the court did not acknowl-
edge, as the next Part argues, that the Ordinance in several aspects
attempts to set Fremont’s own immigration policy.  By lending legiti-
macy to the Ordinance’s form, the court ignored its substance and set
the stage for a patchwork of similar laws across the country.
187. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
188. Keller, 719 F.3d at 943.
189. Id.  This is a curious conclusion given that one of the recitals of the Ordinance
states: “WHEREAS, United States Code Title 8, Section 1324(a)(1)(A) prohibits
the harboring of illegal aliens.  The provision of housing to illegal aliens is a fun-
damental component of the federal immigration crime of harboring . . . .”
Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/B3M9-FSEG.  It seems as though the ordinance’s use of the term “harbor-
ing,” which is defined in the recitals according to federal anti-harboring law,
would indicate an intent to enforce that federal law.
190. Keller, 719 F.3d at 944.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 944–45.  The court here relied, in part, on cases involving immigrant em-
ployment—specifically DeCanas and Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whit-
ing, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011)—to support its position. Id.  The interchangeability of
cases involving housing and employment provisions is problematic, not least be-
cause the federal government provides specific determinations of employment
status to which local law can adhere; there is no equivalent for housing.
193. Id. at 943.
194. Id. at 941 (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 n.23 (1982)).
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III. ARGUMENT—WHY THE FREMONT ORDINANCE
IS PREEMPTED
Preemption, as rendered by Keller, is a doctrine too weak to
achieve the uniformity it exists to accomplish.  In the court’s reticence
to recognize full federal preemptive authority over AIHOs, Keller de-
ferred to Fremont’s own characterization of the Ordinance as “the reg-
ulation of rental accommodation.”195  Yet what the Ordinance
effectuates in fact is immigrant removal, intruding upon areas struc-
turally preempted.  The Ordinance also regulates fields—alien re-
moval, registration, and harboring—occupied by the complex and
comprehensive structure of the INA.  Lastly, the Ordinance is an ob-
stacle to the policy objectives attained by the calibrated balance of
ramifications contained in the INA’s provisions.  The Ordinance is too
blunt an instrument for local interests to justify implementing;
Fremont has other, more-precise tools with which to address its
concerns.
A. The Police Power Presumption Against Preemption
Should Not Apply
In discussing the Ordinance’s anti-harboring provision and admon-
ishing against an expansive view of field preemption, Keller invoked
the “clear and manifest purpose” language without a discussion of the
police power presumption.196  This could simply mean the court did
not apply the presumption despite referring to the heightened stan-
dard.  But the court’s evaluation of the INA’s anti-harboring provision
indicates otherwise.197  That provision, which the court refers to as
“one sub-part of one subsection,”198 is part of a section of the INA deal-
ing entirely with the “[b]ringing in and harboring [of] certain
aliens,”199 and it contains several other provisions that apply to the
sub-part the court identifies.200  In a terse style, the Keller court
searches for clearer Congressional intent without a thorough evalua-
tion of the INA’s anti-harboring section.201  Searching for express pre-
195. Principal Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants the City of Fremont, Keller v. City
of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-1702, 12-1705, 12-1708), 2012
WL 2884121, at *22.
196. Keller, 719 F. 3d at 943 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)).  See
supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text for a discussion of the police power
presumption and its heightened standard, under Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Com-
pany, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), of a clear and manifest purpose by Congress to
preempt state law.
197. Keller, 719 F.3d at 943.
198. Id.
199. INA § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012).
200. Id. See infra notes 269–75 and accompanying text.
201. Keller, 719 F.3d at 942 (“Congress could put an end to any such practice, wide-
spread or not, by exercising its express preemption powers.”).
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emption to the exclusion of less-explicit implied forms is just the sort
of analysis to be expected under the police power presumption.  The
court’s characterization of the Ordinance as a “local property licensing
program” underscores the conclusion that it views Fremont as merely
regulating within the traditional police powers of the city.202
The court’s decision to invoke the clear and manifest purpose stan-
dard without a discussion of the presumption is, at the very least,
problematic in interpreting the opinion.  As a matter of precedent, the
Supreme Court has squarely addressed the presumption and its
heightened standard of a clear and manifest purpose in recent
cases.203  The language Keller quoted was used in DeCanas in the con-
text of states’ “broad authority under their police powers” to imple-
ment “regulation designed to protect vital state interests.”204  Keller
did not, however, grapple with the assumption underlying application
of the presumption in the case before it—the assumption that the Or-
dinance regulates housing.  Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to con-
tend that states have not traditionally done so.  But the Ordinance
does not regulate housing; it regulates immigrant residency.205
Aside from a negligible licensing fee and the cursory provision of
basic information that a renter would already have to provide on a
standard lease, the grant of an occupancy permit is conditioned solely
on immigrant status.  The regulatory effect of the Ordinance is not
predicated on any aspect of the rental properties to which it applies—
not the properties’ quality, safety, location, availability, or af-
fordability—but on the federal immigration status of the tenant.206
202. Id. at 943.
203. See, e.g., Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 554 (2009)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing presumption and Rice’s heightened stan-
dard); United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (same); Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (same).
204. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356–57 (1976).  The court directly characterized
the state law at issue as squarely within the states’ historic police powers. Id. at
357 (“California’s attempt in § 2805(a) to prohibit the knowing employment by
California employers of persons not entitled to lawful residence in the United
States, let alone to work here, is certainly within the mainstream of such police
power regulation.”).
205. The Third Circuit in Lozano II interpreted the Hazleton ordinances as “nothing
more than a thinly veiled attempt to regulate residency under the guise of a regu-
lation of rental housing.” Lozano II, 724 F.3d 297, 315 (3d Cir. 2013).  Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit in Farmers Branch I found that “[t]he text of the [City of Farm-
ers Branch, Texas ordinance], and the circumstances surrounding its adoption,
show[ed] that its purpose and effect [were] to regulate immigration . . . rather
than to regulate housing.” Farmers Branch I, 675 F.3d 802, 809 (2012).
206. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/B3M9-FSEG.  The court in Farmers Branch I, makes this point as well:
[T]he [Farmers Branch] [o]rdinance has virtually nothing to say about
the housing rental market, except for boilerplate language referencing
the City’s police power to protect its citizens.  The regulatory scheme cre-
ated by the Ordinance has none of the indicia one would expect of a hous-
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Nor does the Ordinance cite any impact by undocumented immigrants
on privately-rented housing.207  The primary—perhaps only—effect of
the Ordinance is to regulate which immigrants may rent—and thus
reside—in Fremont.  As Justice Kennedy phrased it in United States
v. Locke, “an ‘assumption’ of nonpre-emption is not triggered when the
State regulates in an area where there has been a history of signifi-
cant federal presence.”208  The federal government has regulated the
residency of immigrants in the United States for about 150 years at
least,209 and has been present in the area of immigration generally
since the nation’s inception.210  The presumption should not apply
given the Ordinance’s substance, whatever its nominal designation.
In contradistinction to the Ordinance, the California statute up-
held in DeCanas was narrowly tailored to address the economic effects
of additional labor supplied by undocumented migrant workers.  It di-
rectly regulated employment and conditioned a penalty on an “adverse
effect on lawful resident workers.”211  The law was what the state pur-
ported it to be—a regulation of California’s economic interests that,
incident to its operation, affected undocumented immigrants.212  In
this sense, it is distinguishable from the Ordinance, which invokes not
a single concern for the private housing rental market in Fremont.
The Ordinance’s use of the term “housing” to address perceived con-
cerns about crime and the cost of public benefits is a fig leaf for its
regulation of immigrant residency.
ing regulation.  For example, the Ordinance says nothing about the
location, design, construction, maintenance, ownership, or alteration of
residential rental units.  It also provides no regulation for the number of
residents or the permitted uses of rental housing.  The Ordinance cre-
ates an application process for an occupancy license, but the applicant is
not required to submit information about his employment or credit his-
tory, his past residence information, or his criminal history.  All that is
required, besides standard information such as one’s name and address,
is one’s citizenship information.  Moreover, the only reason an occupancy
license may be revoked is based on immigration status.  On its face then
the Ordinance hardly evinces a purpose to regulate rental housing in the
City and instead points toward the real target of the regulation—the fer-
reting out and exclusion of undesirable illegal immigrants.
Farmers Branch I, 675 F.3d at 809–10 (5th Cir. 2012).  All of these points apply
equally well to the Fremont ordinance.
207. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/B3M9-FSEG.
208. 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000).
209. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (Field, J., dissent-
ing) (discussing regulation of residency of Chinese laborers under the 1868 Bur-
lingame-Seward Treaty). See also INA § 101(a)(20), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) (2012)
(defining “lawfully admitted for permanent residence”); INA § 245, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255 (2012) (“Adjustment of status of nonimmigrant to that of person admitted
for permanent residence”).
210. See supra section II.B.
211. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
212. Id. at 357.
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The conclusion that the Ordinance’s housing provisions lie outside
the states’ historic police powers is primarily a function of those provi-
sions’ methods, rather than the legitimacy of Fremont’s concern for
the fiscal impact of undocumented immigrants on the city.  It is worth
noting, however, that in Plyler v. Doe213—as in DeCanas214—the Su-
preme Court tied state regulatory power to deter undocumented immi-
grants to the economic impact they might have on “the State’s
economy generally, or the State’s ability to provide some important
service.”215  In striking down a state anti-immigrant statute on equal-
protection grounds, Plyler cited the district court’s reliance on studies
indicating “aliens underutilize public services, while contributing
their labor to the local economy and tax money to the state fisc.”216
This suggests that a few words on the economic impact of undocu-
mented immigrants on Nebraska are appropriate.
The Ordinance claims an increased fiscal burden on the city due to
an increased demand for public benefits and services.217  The legiti-
macy of this concern, however, is not borne out any more convincingly
here than it was in Plyler.  Undocumented immigrants in Nebraska
are already denied most public services by both federal and state
law.218  To the extent they utilize available services such as emer-
gency room visits219 or English-language education programs in local
schools, the economic contributions of this population are ameliora-
tive, if not greater.  In 2010, undocumented immigrants provided
$43.3 million to Nebraska in state and local taxes.220  Of course, the
available data is not comprehensive given the shadow status of un-
213. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
214. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
215. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 n.23.
216. Id. at 228.
217. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/B3M9-FSEG.
218. See Act of Apr. 8, 2009, LB 403, 2009 Neb. Laws 788 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of NEB. REV. STAT. ch. 77 (Reissue 2009)) (denying public bene-
fits for undocumented immigrants except for emergency medical and disaster re-
lief, immunizations, and community services such as soup kitchens and crisis
counseling centers); Tanya Broder and Jonathan Blazer, Overview of Immigrant
Eligibility for Federal Programs, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW CENTER (Oct.
2011), http://www.nilc.org/overview-immeligfedprograms.html#note7, archived
at http://perma.unl.edu/MM96-P4E4. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012) (authoriz-
ing States to limit eligibility of State public benefits for certain classes of
immigrants).
219. The extent of this burden may not be as great as sometimes claimed. See, King,
supra note 12.
220. Am. Immigration Council, New Americans in Nebraska: The Political and Eco-
nomic Power of Immigrants, Latinos, and Asians in the Cornhusker State, IMMI-
GRATION POLICY CENTER 2 (May 2013), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/
default/files/docs/new_americans_in_nebraska_2013_0.pdf, archived at http://
perma.unl.edu/6U4J-4CPJ.
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documented populations.221  At the very least, the ambiguity of un-
documented immigrants’ economic impact on Nebraska fails to
buttress any purported exercise of Fremont’s police powers.
B. The Ordinance Is Structurally Preempted as a Removal
Policy
Without the benefit of being characterized as a local law regulating
local interests within Fremont’s competency, the Ordinance is laid
bare as an immigrant-removal policy.  Removal falls squarely within
the core area of immigration policies subject exclusively to federal au-
thority.222  This is the determination made in Lozano I, Lozano II, and
Farmers Branch I, but rejected in Keller.  The question for structural
preemption, then, is whether the effect and the purpose of the Ordi-
nance, irrespective of labels, is the removal of undocumented immi-
grants from Fremont’s borders.  If it is, then Fremont has essentially
engaged in the removal function of federal immigration law
enforcement.
Clearly, the effect of the Ordinance is the removal of undocu-
mented immigrants.  For many immigrants, being denied the ability
to rent in a particular locality is functionally equivalent to being re-
moved from that locality.  An undocumented immigrant wishing to re-
side in Fremont is faced with few choices.  While home ownership is
not entirely unrealistic for some,223 for most it is not an option.224
The poverty rate for undocumented immigrants—over 20%—is more
than double the national average for U.S.-born adults.225  In 2007, the
median household income of undocumented immigrants was only
$36,000, and this amount was spread over an average household 40%
larger than the average U.S.-born household.226  The only realistic op-
tion for most is to leave Fremont.  As the dissent noted: “The Ordi-
nance prevents undocumented persons from renting in Fremont,
221. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 11, at 1 (“It is important to note, though,
that currently available estimates have significant limitations.”).
222. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–2500 (2012).
223. See Olivia Blanco Mullins, Illegal Status No Bar to Immigrants Buying Homes,
HOUS. CHRONICLE (Aug. 4, 2006), http://www.chron.com/business/real-estate/arti-
cle/Illegal-status-no-bar-to-immigrants-buying-homes-1872974.php, archived at
http://perma.unl.edu/P5CC-FMMP.
224. See also Lozano I, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Even if [purchasing a home
or staying with others who have] were viable alternatives for [undocumented im-
migrants wishing to rent] . . . many others would be excluded, and that is suffi-
cient for these provisions to be pre-empted.”)
225. See Jeffrey Passal & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the
United States, PEW HISPANIC CTR. 17 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic
.org/files/reports/107.pdf, archived at http://perma.unl.edu/3EV5-2RKT.
226. Id. at 16.
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which is tantamount to preventing them from living in the city at
all.”227
The Ordinance, in its recitals, also purposes the removal of un-
documented immigrants.  These “WHEREAS” clauses cite the “fiscal
burden on the City;” “[c]rimes committed” that “harm the health,
safety and welfare” of citizens and lawfully present immigrants; and
the displacement of authorized workers caused by the presence of un-
documented immigrants.228  Clearly, what underlies this Ordinance is
not a concern for the housing rental market, but a desire to rid the city
of a population it does not want.  The Ordinance, by effectively and
purposefully removing persons from the city based on no other crite-
rion than immigrant status, attempts to usurp the power of removal
from federal control.
The Keller court was reluctant to find the Ordinance effectuates
removal because there was “no record evidence that aliens denied oc-
cupancy licenses in the City will likely leave the country, as opposed to
obtaining other housing in the City, renting outside the City, or relo-
cating to other parts of the country.”229  Furthermore, the court found
that whatever effect the Ordinance may have, it was not within the
prescribed boundaries of structurally preempted regulation of immi-
gration under the DeCanas test—whether a state or local law is “es-
sentially a determination of who should or should not be admitted into
the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may re-
main.”230  The Keller court also read the Supreme Court’s preference
for preemption on narrower statutory grounds in Chamber of Com-
merce of the U.S. v. Whiting231 as an implication that structural pre-
emption was not applicable.232
As a matter of law, the Ordinance’s methods and purpose could
only be interpreted as a removal policy, absent any factual record.  By
conditioning the ability to rent on immigration status, the Ordinance
is a facial attempt to set a Fremont-specific immigration policy.  The
Ordinance is distinguishable from the California statute in DeCanas
in that the latter affected immigration incident to a valid facial con-
cern.  The Ordinance’s facial focus on “housing” as opposed to “immi-
gration” is so cursory and transparent as to make any interpretation
of the law as anything other than an immigrant-removal policy
untenable.
227. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 954 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2140 (2014) (Bright, J., dissenting).
228. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/B3M9-FSEG.
229. Keller, 719 F.3d at 941.
230. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
231. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011).
232. Keller, 719 F.3d at 942.
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Regarding the DeCanas test, the determination of removability it-
self requires a determination that an undocumented immigrant was
inadmissible at the time he or she entered the country.233  To the ex-
tent, then, the Ordinance is a removal policy, it is, in fact, a determi-
nation of admissibility, and so lies within DeCanas’s limitations.
Finally, the Keller court’s reliance on Whiting’s absence of a discussion
on structural preemption overemphasizes the Supreme Court’s stance
on the subject.  The Supreme Court has indeed tended to shy away
from vindicating the federal government’s Constitutional and sover-
eignty-based justifications for preemption.  But neither has the Court
rejected those justifications.  Not only are The Chinese Exclusion Case
and its progeny good, binding law, but the Court—post-Whiting—ex-
plicitly referenced those Constitutional and sovereignty-based justifi-
cations in Arizona.234
Some scholars, it should be noted, have questioned the constitu-
tional basis for structural preemption of state immigration laws.235
They argue that the federal government’s power over foreign affairs is
an arguable basis for extending the Constitution’s grant to Congress
of power over naturalization and foreign commerce to complete pre-
emption of state immigration regulation.236  It may or may not be that
the necessity of foreign nations to deal with one voice should eclipse
the right of states, as sovereigns, from regulating foreign nationals.
Indeed, it was not until the late nineteenth century that the Supreme
Court recognized the structural nature of federal authority in immi-
gration.237  Structural preemption may close the book, as one com-
mentator phrased it, on “a more nuanced debate on the proper
allocation of authority.”238  A view of the architecture of federalism in
immigration that recognizes a greater role for state and local govern-
ments would allow for a discussion of the merits of federalism, “such
233. See supra note 153.
234. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506–07 (2012). See supra note 131
and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Feder-
alism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008) (“[C]oncluding that the Constitution pre-
cludes state and local authority over pure immigration law casts a long shadow
on any state or local conduct concerning immigration, even conduct that falls
short of pure immigration law.”); Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in
an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 121, 123 (arguing “the presump-
tion of national uniformity and control over foreign relations matters—including
immigration—no longer prevails in a post-national world order,” and concluding
“that state-level treatment of aliens could be more rationally measured and con-
strained by international norms relating to the treatment of aliens than by con-
stitutional norms of uncertain application and legitimacy.”).
236. See supra note 235.
237. See supra subsection II.C.1.
238. Huntington, supra note 235, at 792.
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as balancing uniformity with experimentalism and participation with
parochialism.”239
Yet the kind of removal policy enacted by the Ordinance must still
be viewed as contrary to constitutional design.  Restrictive policies to-
ward undocumented immigrants in one state or locality may result in
the influx of undocumented populations to other less restrictive areas,
causing friction between states and increasing burdens on immigrants
and their family members—some of whom were born in the United
States.  This concern for problems arising from non-uniform state poli-
cies underlay the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause
and Naturalization Clause.240  With increased variability through ex-
perimentation in local immigration policies comes an increased risk of
constitutional violations due to racial profiling or laws targeting cer-
tain classes of people.  In any event, the Supreme Court has reaf-
firmed as recently as 2012 that the traditional justifications for
structural preemption in immigration—uniformity and the implica-
tion of foreign affairs—still undergird prevailing immigration pol-
icy.241  In some circumstances, it may be desirable to limit the policies
used to achieve uniformity to allow for experimentation, but the wis-
dom of testing immigration policies in the states is far from
compelling.242
C. Keller’s Locality Distinction Undermines the Objectives
of Federal Authority over Immigration
In finding that the Ordinance does not remove immigrants, Keller
relied on a distinction between removal of immigrants from the
United States and removal from a particular locality.  The court ar-
gued that federal authority over immigration pertains to the determi-
nation of admission into the United States as a whole—to the United
States’ external boundaries—and does not extend to the presence of
undocumented immigrants in a particular location.243  This distinc-
tion fails to recognize the objectives underlying the plenary nature of
federal authority over immigration.  As reiterated in Arizona, this au-
thority exists, in part, out of the necessity of dealing with foreign na-
239. Id. at 793.
240. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–12 (2012) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 69.
241. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498 (“It is fundamental that foreign countries concerned
about the status, safety, and security of their nationals in the United States must
be able to confer and communicate on this subject with one national sovereign,
not the 50 separate States.”).
242. See, e.g., Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position:
Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 998–1003 (2004).
243. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 941 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2140 (2014).
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tionals with “one voice.”244  Yet while a decision on whether to remove
an individual is pending with a federal agency, that individual—
under Keller—is potentially faced with a motley patchwork of state
and local policies.  Rather than one voice, the locality distinction
would present foreign nationals with a cacophony of varying policies
and would thereby potentially undermine the United States’ ability to
calculate its dealings in foreign affairs.
Federal authority over naturalization and admission serves an ad-
ditional goal: the filtering out of individuals the United States does
not want from those who are welcome.  Yet local removal schemes run
the risk of deterring both.  An immigrant whose status is under
agency adjudication is likely to be deterred from viewing Fremont, or
any other place with an AIHO, as an option for residency.  Further-
more, by forcing immigrants to migrate, local removal policies run the
risk of making it difficult for the federal government to locate immi-
grants, thereby impeding the ability of federal agencies to separate
the wheat from the chaff.245  Thus, the need to locate and select immi-
grants for admission or removal—like the need for uniformity in deal-
ing with foreign nationals—counsels toward extending the national
government’s control over admission and removal not only to national
borders but also to all of the United States’ constituent localities.
In short, the locality distinction falls short of the practical require-
ments involved in determining immigration policy, the goal of uniform
action sought under the Naturalization Clause, and the federal gov-
ernment’s power over foreign affairs.  It may be true that a person
removed from a state or political subdivision is not expelled from the
larger whole, but the grant or denial of admission into the United
States includes access to or exclusion from all of its constituent parts.
Although admission—as described in DeCanas and in the INA—per-
tains to lawful entry of an immigrant, undocumented immigrants are
not foreclosed from admission until a federal order for removal has
been issued.246  The DeCanas test247 turned on admission precisely
because it is solely the national government’s decision, and with that
exclusivity must come a negative restriction on states and localities
from making that determination for themselves.  Thus, the fact that
the Ordinance only affects undocumented immigrants within
Fremont’s borders cannot be determinative of how it fares under fed-
eral preemption.
244. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506–07.
245. See infra section III.E.
246. See supra note 151–53 and accompanying text; infra notes 278–79 and accompa-
nying text.
247. Under DeCanas, a regulation of immigration is “a determination of who should or
should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions under which a legal
entrant may remain.”  DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976).
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Plyler made clear that states “might have an interest in mitigating
the potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts in popula-
tion,”248 and they may take measures to deter undocumented immi-
grants.249  Nebraska has taken such measures by, for example,
denying undocumented immigrants certain state public benefits or
privileges and employment opportunities.250  Yet Plyler also main-
tained “illegal entry into the country would not, under traditional cri-
teria, bar a person from obtaining domicile within a State.”251
Fremont may deter, but it—or any other locality within the United
States—may not remove, even from only its own borders.  As the court
in Lozano I phrased it, “[t]o be meaningful, the federal government’s
exclusive control over residence in this country must extend to any
political subdivision.”252
If the Ordinance does indeed remove aliens from the city, and if
Keller’s locality distinction illegitimately compromises federal author-
ity to determine admission into the country, then the housing provi-
sions certainly enter the structurally preempted area of regulation of
immigration.  The Keller decision can comport with the doctrine of
structural preemption only with a blind eye to the purpose and effect
of the Ordinance, and a conception of federal authority substantially
weaker than what would be needed for that authority’s intended pur-
pose—uniformity and a single national voice—to materialize.
D. The Ordinance Is Field Preempted by the Immigration
and Nationality Act
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)253 sprawls across 160-
odd sections and four titles.  It provides the main statutory framework
for federal regulation of immigration, and it has been repeatedly
amended to address Congressional concerns over immigration.  The
INA’s provisions cover an array of immigration fields, including exclu-
sion,254 admission,255 adjustment of status,256 alien registration,257
naturalization,258 and refugee assistance.259  The comprehensive na-
248. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 220, 228 (1982).
249. “[W]e cannot conclude that the States are without any power to deter the influx of
persons entering the United States against federal law, and whose numbers
might have a discernible impact on traditional state concerns.” Id. at 228 n.23.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 16–24.
251. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227 n.22.
252. Lozano I, 620 F.3d 170, 221 (3d Cir. 2010).
253. INA §§ 101–507, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
254. Id. §§ 231–44, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–54.
255. Id. §§ 211–19, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181–89.
256. Id. §§ 245–50, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255–60.
257. Id. §§ 261–66, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301–06.
258. Id. §§ 301–61, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1504.
259. Id. §§ 411–14, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–24.
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ture of the INA evinces intent by Congress to have the last word in
determining immigration policy.
Turning first to removal, the INA specifies that ‘removable’ means,
“in the case of an alien not admitted to the United States, that the
alien is inadmissible.”260  It also provides that its removal proceedings
are the “sole and exclusive” means of determining admissibility.261  In
addition, the INA provides an array of procedural protections and ex-
ceptions for these proceedings.262  Federal officers are given a discrete
set of authorities, and state officers are given particular delegated re-
sponsibilities limiting their role to arrest only.263  This statutory
scheme is comprehensive in its scope, and to the extent the Ordinance
is a removal policy, it encroaches a field occupied by pervasive Con-
gressional regulation.
Looking next at alien registration, Hines and Arizona make clear
that federal law occupies this field as well.264  The court in Keller,
however, found the Ordinance was not a registration scheme.265  The
court found the Ordinance distinguishable from the registration laws
struck down in Hines and Arizona cases because it only applies to im-
migrants that rent and excludes those that do not.  Yet the Ordinance
aims its efforts at rental housing not only to remove but also to iden-
tify undocumented immigrants present in the city,266 contemplating
the vast majority of that population as comprised of renters.267  If the
Ordinance’s recitals are to be taken at face value, then Fremont in-
tended to remove undocumented immigrants as a population by
260. Id. § 240(e)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2)(A).
261. “[A] proceeding under this section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for
determining whether an alien may be admitted to the United States.” Id.
§ 240(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3).
262. See sources cited infra notes 281, 283–84.
263. INA § 287, 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012).
264. See id. § 262, 8 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (requiring adult immigrants staying in the coun-
try more than thirty days who have not received visas to register within thirty
days); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012)  (“[T]he Federal
Government has occupied the field of alien registration.”); Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 72–74 (1941).
265. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 942–43 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2140 (2014).
266. The district court recognized the Ordinance as a “means for the Defendants to
identify who is residing within the City’s boundaries and their immigration sta-
tus.”  Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d 959, 979 (D. Neb. 2012) aff’d in
part, rev’d in part and remanded, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2140 (2014).
267. See Lozano II, 724 F.3d 297, 322 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The [Hazleton ordinance’s]
rental registration scheme serves no discernible purpose other than to register
the immigration status of a subset of the City’s population. It can only be viewed
as an impermissible alien registration requirement.”). Lozano II also found
AIHO’s distinguishable as a registration scheme from the granting of privileges
like drivers’ licenses, a distinction Keller did not recognize. Id. See supra note
161 and accompanying text.
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targeting those who rent.  The obvious implication is that nearly all
undocumented immigrants in Fremont are renters, otherwise the Or-
dinance would not have its intended effect.  To the extent the Ordi-
nance attempts to ascertain and identify a particular immigrant
population, it should be preempted as an alien registration program.
Finally, the Keller court was also unconvinced of the Ordinance’s
intrusion into the field of harboring:
We find nothing in an anti-harboring prohibition contained in one sub-part of
one subsection of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 that establishes a “framework of regulation
so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it,” or
evinces “a federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.”268
Despite the court’s diminutive characterization of the INA’s anti-har-
boring provision, that section (titled “Bringing in and harboring cer-
tain aliens”)269 provides for criminal penalties for harboring,270
exceptions for religious organizations to provide room and board,271
enforcement authority,272 rules of evidence,273 and a public outreach
program.274  As recognized in Hazleton II, South Carolina, Georgia
Latino Alliance, Alabama, and Valle Del Sol,275 federal anti-harboring
provisions represent a comprehensive enactment pursuant to a domi-
nant federal interest in uniformity.
E. The Ordinance Is an Obstacle to the INA’s Objectives
Conflict preemption appears to be the form of preemption most
widely used by courts in striking down state anti-immigrant laws.276
By attempting to use the federal removal process towards its own
ends, the Ordinance creates inconsistencies with the INA that upend
the “careful balance struck by Congress.”277 Although any of the con-
flicts with the INA noted in Lozano I, Lozano II, Farmers Branch I,
and Farmers Branch II apply here as well, the discussion below fo-
268. Keller, 719 F.3d at 943 (quoting Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2501); see INA
§ 274(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).
269. INA § 274, 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012) (emphasis added).
270. Id. § 274(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iv).
271. Id. § 274(a)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(C).
272. Id. § 274(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(c).
273. Id. § 274(b)(3), (d), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(3), (d).
274. Id. § 274(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(e).
275. See supra notes 142–43.
276. Conflict preemption was the sole ground for preemption in Farmers Branch II,
726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013), and for the underlying district court decision in
Keller.  Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d (D. Neb. 2012), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, and remanded, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2140 (2014).
277. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012).
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cuses on the more robust obstacles the Ordinance presents to federal
law.278
The snapshot argument from Lozano I is equally applicable to Kel-
ler. The Ordinance’s fixation on whether an immigrant is “lawfully
present” at a moment in time presents an obstacle to the objectives
underlying the federal government’s determination that status should
be fluid.279  Plyler again contains apposite language here:
[I]t is impossible for a State to determine which aliens the Federal Govern-
ment will eventually deport, which the Federal Government will permit to
stay, and which the Federal Government will ultimately naturalize.  Until an
undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal Government, no State
can be assured that the alien will not be found to have a federal permission to
reside in the country, perhaps even as a citizen.  Indeed, even the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service cannot predict with certainty whether any in-
dividual alien has a right to reside in the country until deportation
proceedings have run their course.280
Once the federal government initiates removal proceedings against an
undocumented immigrant, or even after it orders the immigrant re-
moved, a change to lawful status is still possible.281  This removal sys-
tem balances concerns including, on the one hand, the United States’
interest in authorizing and inspecting entrants,282 but on the other,
preventing hardship to lawfully admitted family members,283
preventing harm to the immigrant,284 and more.285
278. This Note will not discuss the potential for conflict arising from state judicial
review as discussed in Farmers Branch II.  Such a discussion is warranted as
part of a comprehensive review of the Ordinance. See supra text accompanying
notes 176–78.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 149–55.
280. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 220, 240 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1252, 1253(h), 1254 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)).
281. See, e.g., INA § 240(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (giving discretion to an
Immigration Judge (IJ) to determine admissibility); id. § 240(b)(5)(C), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C) (providing a removal order issued after a failure to appear may
be later rescinded); id. § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (providing for judicial review of
removal orders); id. § 244(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1)(A) (granting temporary
protected status (TPS) to aliens who may otherwise be removable). See also, Er-
azo-Artica v. Ashcroft, 81 Fed. Appx. 161 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that although
IJ may initiate removal proceedings against undocumented immigrant while TPS
application is pending, IJ cannot execute removal order until final TPS determi-
nation is made).
282. Supra subsection II.B.1.
283. See INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (authorizing Attorney General to change
from deportable or removable to lawfully present status of certain classes of
aliens, such as those for whom removal may place an undue hardship on lawfully
admitted family members, or children of battered spouses); id. § 216(b)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(2) (placing burden of proof on the Department of Homeland
Security during review of removal proceedings for absence of qualifying
marriage).
284. Id. § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (providing for asylum for political refugees); id. § 244, 8
U.S.C. § 1254a (providing TPS for nationals of countries with armed conflicts,
national disasters, instability, or other conditions).
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The majority in Keller responded to the snapshot argument:
It seems obvious that, if the federal government will be unable to definitively
report that an alien is “unlawfully present,” then the rental provisions are
simply ineffectual.  Plaintiffs and the United States do not explain why a local
law is conflict-preempted when the federal government has complete power to
avoid the conflict.286
This passage inverts the operative structure of preemption, and puts
the onus on the federal government to “avoid the conflict.”  Within im-
migration law, this obligation should run the other direction. Keller
proclaims that should the federal government fail to conform its law
so as to provide a response to state inquiries amenable to the Ordi-
nance’s operation, it must cede discretion for removal to local officials.
If a local official decides a person who does not have lawful status is
“unlawfully present,” and takes action based on that snapshot, they
have effectively ignored the nature of federal procedures.  The federal
government’s failure to definitively report an alien is unlawfully pre-
sent—rather than render the Ordinance ineffectual—would render
the Ordinance effective in a manner that conflicts with federal re-
moval procedures.
Citing Arizona’s treatment of § 2(B) of the Arizona law at issue in
that case, the Keller court felt the potential for a non-decisive federal
response to a status inquiry by state officials was too speculative to
strike down the Ordinance on a facial challenge.287  The issue raised
by § 2(B) in Arizona, however, was that that provision could be imple-
mented in one of two ways—in a manner that conflicted with federal
law and in a manner that did not.288  The Supreme Court was unwill-
ing to hypothesize about how the law would be applied in order to
determine whether it was preempted without a definitive interpreta-
tion from state courts.289  There is nothing like this kind of ambiguity
in the Ordinance about which the Keller court can speculate.  As dis-
cussed earlier in this section, it is a certainty that the federal govern-
ment cannot give a definitive status on which local authorizes may
rely until an order for removal has been entered.290  The only way
285. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (“Discretion in the enforcement of
immigration law embraces immediate human concerns. Unauthorized workers
trying to support their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual
case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children born in
the United States, long ties to the community, or a record of distinguished mili-
tary service. Some discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this
Nation’s international relations.”).
286. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 945 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2140 (2014).
287. Id. at 945.
288. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2534.
289. Id.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 278–81.
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Fremont can implement the ordinance’s housing provisions without
conflicting with federal objectives is to not implement them at all.
The risk that state officials will determine removability also con-
flicts—as in Arizona and Farmers Branch II—with federal enforce-
ment of the INA’s removal provisions.291  The INA leaves
determinations of admissibility to immigration officers, yet the Ordi-
nance puts Fremont’s police department in the position of determining
which federal designations do and do not indicate lawful presence.
Upon a determination by state officials that an immigrant is not law-
fully present, that official may effectively remove the tenant by deny-
ing them access to housing.  This is a manner of removal nothing like
the INA proceedings, and so conflicts with federal law in technique.292
The denial of undocumented immigrant residency by Fremont also
conflicts with the INA.  In many ways, the INA requires residency of
undocumented immigrants in order to function correctly and to
achieve its objectives.  It specifies notice by mail as an acceptable form
of service,293 and specifically requires an “alien must immediately
provide (or have provided) the Attorney General with a written record
of an address and telephone number (if any) at which the alien may be
contacted respecting [removal proceedings].”294  An undocumented
immigrant must also notify the Attorney General of any change in ad-
dress.295  Failure, through no fault of the alien, to receive notice of a
removal proceeding is a basis for rescinding a removal order and re-
opening proceedings.296 Clearly the INA has as an objective the
proper disposition of removal proceedings, and facilitating undocu-
mented immigrants’ participation in those proceedings.
The INA also provides a definition for “harboring,” as it is used in
the Ordinance.  The majority in Keller dismissed this by noting, “Con-
gress has not preempted use of the word ‘harboring.’”297  Yet the Ordi-
nance openly confines itself to the federal meaning of this term in its
recitals, stating “[t]he provision of housing to illegal aliens is a funda-
mental component of the federal immigration crime of harboring,” and
“[t]his Ordinance is in harmony with the congressional objectives of
291. See supra text accompanying notes 126–28, 169–75.
292. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (“The Court has recognized that a ‘[c]onflict in
technique can be fully as disruptive to the system Congress enacted as conflict in
overt policy.’”) (quoting Amalgamated Assoc. of St., Elec. Ry., & Motor Coach
Emp. of Am. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971)).
293. INA § 239(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2012).
294. Id. § 239(a)(1)(F)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(i).
295. Id. § 239(a)(1)(F)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(F)(ii).
296. Id. § 240(b)(5)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii).
297. Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931, 943 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2140 (2014).
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prohibiting the knowing harboring of illegal aliens.”298  In applying
the INA’s use of harboring to a situation—private contracting between
landlords and tenants—in which has never been applied, the Ordi-
nance upsets the implementation of the harboring provision for the
purposes Congress intended.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fremont’s attempt to regulate immigrant residency might reflect
legitimate concerns over federal immigration policy and the effects of
undocumented immigrants on state resources.  State and local govern-
ments may deal with such concerns with policies tailored to the per-
ceived evil.  The attempt, however, to implement blanket policies that
serve to indiscriminately remove an undesirable population based on
immigration status falls short of such tailoring.  Such an attempt can
only be seen as Fremont’s own special immigration regime, and a det-
riment to the goals of national control over immigration.
AIHOs raise numerous other concerns besides issues of preemp-
tion.  They raise possibilities of race-based discrimination and extra
burdens placed on landlords and lawful immigrants.  AIHOs also re-
flect a disconcerting xenophobia toward a portion of the population—
immigrants—that take center stage in American history, culture, and
identity.  Although the full breadth of these concerns is beyond the
scope of this Note, such implications are within the ambit of Congres-
sional policies.  Preemption, then, incorporates something more im-
portant than a technicality of federalism; it guards the values and
priorities lawmakers have felt are best reified with a single national
voice.  If, however, the Keller II holding is left to stand, the efficacy of
that guardianship will be diminished.
298. Fremont, Neb., Ordinance 5165 (June 21, 2010), archived at http://perma.unl
.edu/B3M9-FSEG.
